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1. A specific area of the law of political transformation in Central-Eastern-
Europe is constituted by the law of privatisation, which qualifies as an antithesis 
to the law of the economic evolution of socialism, scilicet, the law of nationali-
sation. It is a mere provisional area of law, since it is dispensable in mature 
capitalism, therefore, it will gradually erode from Hungarian business law. 
 In economic sociological literature and subsequently, in mass communica-
tion, the term of privatisation is applied in a much broader sense than its 
Hungarian term is circumscribed under positive law. For instance, in American 
social science literature, privatisation defines the decrease of the intervention 
of the state into economic and social processes, thereby, as a collective term, it 
encompasses liberalisation, decentralisation and deregulation.1 Whereas, in 
Hungary the establishment of private enterprises that had accrued from their 
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 1 See, e.g., Savas, E. S.: Privatisation. The Key to Better Government. New Jersey, 
1987.; T. Clarke, T.–Pitales, C. (eds.): The Political Economy of Privatisation. London–
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own resources, the so-called crop investments of foreign capital and the evolution 
of the proprietary status of the members of co-operatives within cooperatives 
have been several times defined as privatisation. As a matter of course, these 
elements have contributed to the evolution of the “private” character of 
Hungarian society, but de jure, these do not qualify as privatisation. It is not 
privatisation in a narrower legal sense, either, when the state transfers assets 
generally for free to other forms of public property, e.g., to the property of 
regional and local governments, public bodies (e.g., the Hungarian Academy 
of Sciences) or to the church (albeit, the latter transaction is also termed as 
reprivatisation, since a significant share of the property of the church had been 
nationalised during socialism). 
 In terms of Hungarian positive law, privatisation implies the transfer of 
state-owned property to private property. Therefore, privatisation shall not 
encompass the transfer of assets that are not owned by the state, but by other 
public proprietor (e.g., local government) into private property. Finally, it does 
not constitute privatisation either, when the private proprietor does not acquire 
property, but e.g., rights of usufruct (so-called privatisation of rights of 
commons and functions, e.g., via concessions in case of state monopolies or 
via the so-called privatisational leasing). The term of private proprietor with 
respect to privatisation was positively defined under Para. (4) of Article 1 of 
Act 39 of 1995 on the Sale of State-Owned Venture Capital (hereinafter: AP). 
 Nevertheless, we need to further narrow the legal concept of privatisation. 
Hungarian law pertaining to privatisation (from the outset, but as it is most 
completely incorporated under Act 39 of 1995, i.e., under AP) renders the 
concept of privatisation by circumscribing it as the sale of shares exclusively in 
state-owned associations (stocks, business shares in limited liability companies) 
to private proprietors via privatisation agreements. Other forms of the cessation 
of state-owned property, e.g., the alienation of real estates or art treasures 
under deeds of sale and selling off via liquidation procedures, etc. (so-called 
hidden or intangible privatisation)2 did not fall under the effect of AP. Scilicet, 
AP endeavoured to regulate exclusively the sale of business shares in state-
owned companies, that is, enterprises functioning in the form of joint-stock or 
limited liability companies. These were defined as the so-called venture capital 
of the state, which could or needed to be sold by the state pursuant to AP. 
Namely, this property could persist only provisionally as state property, since 
it needed to be privatised with the exception of the narrow scope of public 
utility companies, which were designed to persist as long-term state property 
  
2 See, e.g., Szanyi, M.: Csőd, felszámolás, végelszámolás mint a privatizáció útja 
(Bankruptcy, Liquidation and Full Settlement As Ways of Privatisation). Budapest, 1998.  
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and to be transferred to the scope of government property after the completion 
of the process of privatisation.3 Further narrowing of the scope of privatisation 
consisted in the stipulation under AP that the transfer of assets free of charge 
shall not qualify as privatisation, either, but that could be effected only 
exceptionally pursuant to a statute. Privatisation shall be effected on grounds 
of a mixed and non-typical sales agreement concluded in compliance with the 
Sale of Goods Act, therefore, the conceptual element of privatisation agree-
ments is countervalue. Privatisation shall be generally implemented at real 
value in return for cash (therefore, Hungarian privatisation qualified as market 
privatisation as opposed to privatisation by coupons implemented in the 
great majority of former socialist states). However, concessional privatisation 
techniques, furthermore, services in kind instead of cash as equivalent (e.g., 
discharge via environmental protection) were alike admissible.4  
 
2. It is a frequent phrase that the underlying dynamics of privatisation in 
Hungary consisted in the intention of the increase of the income of the central 
budget and in the claim of company management to retain their positions and 
acquire property. This assumption, according to my opinion, reflects merely 
the surface. Namely, as opposed to that in Western-European countries, 
privatisation in Hungary and generally in the former socialist states equalled a 
privatisation entailed by political transformation in two senses of the term, 
since it both transformed the proprietary structure and it constituted the sine 
qua non of the functioning of civil states founded on the rule of law and of 
bourgeois market economies. 
  
 3 The distinction of the venture, i.e., business capital of the state from government 
property to be sold according to more rigorous sales rules did not ensue before 2008. See: 
Bencze, I.: A kincstári vagyon a jog tükrében. Számadás a talentumról (Government 
Property As Reflected by Law. An Account on Talents). Budapest, 1998. 28–30. 
 4 We can refer to e.g., property notes, then the issuance of employees’ shares, the purchase 
of concessional shares by small investors, furthermore, the Existential-Credit Programme 
and the Employees Share Scheme (MRP). On the conceptual basis of concessional shares, 
see, Diczházi, B.: A népi részvényszocializmus vázlata (A Sketch of People’s Share-
Socialism). Figyelő, 1988. 45, and Lukács, J.: A gazdaság demokratizálásának útja. A mun-
kavállalók részvénytulajdonlásáról a magyar gazdaságban (The Process of the Democrati-
sation of Economy. On the Ownership of Shares by Employees in Hungarian Economy). 
Budapest, 1990. See further, Gidai, A.: Kedvezményes privatizációs technikák (Concessional 
Privatisation Techniques). Budapest, 1998. 
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 Thence, without the privatisation of the major part of state property 
 
a) the Hungarian state founded on the rule of law could not have evolved, 
since that would have been hindered by the persisting dual-nature of the 
state, the unity of the proprietary and executive powers inherited from 
socialism. Scilicet, what public authorities by reason of the democracy 
based on the multi-party system and the doctrine of the division of powers 
cannot implement, could have been enforced by the state as a proprietor via 
its power of discretion deriving from its right of ownership. It was the 
dissolution of the unity of the powers of the state as an executive authority and 
a proprietor that was essential and in this sense, it was equally indifferent 
what the scale of the revenues of the state deriving from privatisation was, 
or, what kind of background and professions the private persons acceding 
to power had had. 
 
b) Hungarian market economy based on competition could not have evolved, 
since the monolithic unity of state property, the overwhelming superior 
economic power of the state would have precluded the evolution and 
consolidation of real market processes, blocked free market competition, 
thereby, the state would have gained the upperhand of the private enter-
prises of its citizens in the market. 
 
 Western-European privatisation in those states, where significant nationali-
sation had indeed ensued, that is, in Austria, Italy, France and England, was 
system-immanent privatisation, since state property anacronistic in the system 
of private property was reprivatised. These Western states could afford gradual 
privatisation under auspicious economic conditions, furthermore, a relatively 
meagre scale of property was concerned, for instance, 17 p.c. of the national 
property in case of Austria, which disposed of the highest extent of state property. 
Besides, privatisation per se could take place with application of the methods 
of the Stock Exchange, since state ownership concerned not the company, but 
the stock, therefore, neither company reorganisation, nor asset assessment or 
the elaboration of special privatisation law was necessary. Whereas, in Hungary, 
the overwhelming majority of national property needed to be privatised the 
sooner the better with the initial absence of the methods of the Stock 
Exchange.5 En passant, by reason of our compliance with the Soviet model of 
  
 5 See, Korányi, T. G.: Privatizáció a tőzsdén keresztül (Privatisation via the Stock 
Exchange). Budapest, 2000. 
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nationalisation, state-owned companies6 had had to be artificially reorganised 
into business associations and only subsequently could they be privatised. 
With some exceptions, in former socialist states de jure privatisation, that is, 
the adoption of the associational structure, and social-economic privatisation, 
that is, the transfer of the shares of associations into private property were 
separated, furthermore, privatisation could not be effected via the available 
general instruments of the legal system, but a distinct and provisional area 
of law had to be elaborated and a distinct system of institutions was also 
incorporated into the state establishment for the purpose of the enforcement 
of privatisation entailed by the political transformation. Necessarily, privati-
sation took place in two stages and in the absence of a consolidated system of 
market relations, therefore, the available methods of property assessment were 
anomalous. According to my view, however, privatisation in Central-Eastern-
Europe was autotelic from a taxonomic point of view: for the purposes of the 
evolution of the civil state founded on the rule of law and of bourgeois market 
economy, privatisation was an “imperative”, even if it was deemed detrimental 
from the point of view of short- or long-term economic policy.7  
 We need to specify some relevant counter-arguments against privatisation. 
Privatisation should not be effected in a situation of economic crisis (the 
dissolution of the Council for Mutual Economic Assistance, the loss of the 
Soviet market, a situation in which the bankruptcy of the central budget is 
anticipated, etc.). That is valid. Privatisation in Hungary did not dispose of a 
social-economic strategy, and as a matter of fact, we did not know what the 
object of and the value of the object of privatisation exactly was. That is valid. 
However, nor did other former socialist countries dispose of such a strategy, 
including the former GDR. Privatisation was launched without adequate 
  
 6 Two exceptions: The companies of the former GDR were transformed into joint-
stock companies and limited liability companies under the so-called Mantellgesetz of 1990, 
which prescribed them uniform capital stock and nominal capital. (See, Krüger, H. H.–
Kühnel, M.–Thomas, S. (eds.): Transformationsprobleme in Ostdeutschland (Problems of 
the Transformation in East Germany). Opladen, 1990. Whereas, in the successor states of 
the former Yugoslavia, by reason of the system of corporate governance by employees, a 
three-graded reorganisational process was applied: social governance–state property–legal 
privatisation–economic privatisation. See, e.g., Büschenfeld, H.: Privatisierung, ‘gesell-
schaftlichen Eigentums’ in der Nachfolgerstaaten Jugoslawien (Privatisation and National 
Property in the Successor States of Former Yugoslavia). Osteuropa, 35 (1995) No. 3.  
 7 E.g., it is presumably reasonable that Béla Csikós Nagy describes several aspects of 
the privatisation entailed by the political transformation as detrimental from the point of 
view of economic policy. A XX. század magyar gazdaságpolitikája (Economic Policy in 
Hungary in the 20th Century). Budapest, 1996. 241–280. 
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economic, technical and personnel prerequisites, wherefore, an array of cases 
of abuse could occur in its process. That is also valid, but that was the smaller 
evil, since this way the economic change of regime sooner ensued in Hungary 
than in any other former socialist state with the exception of the former GDR, 
furthermore, we could also escape the road of state-capitalism, which emerged 
in the majority of the successor states of the former Soviet Union. En passant, 
privatisation in Hungary was by far more regulated than in the neighbouring 
states, and according to estimates, the scale of abuses was also much lower: we 
did not make it from planned economy back to clans.8 We may also argue that 
privatisation ought not to have been implemented as a dumping sale, since 
thereby, privatisation was marked by the features of a sellout and national 
assets were considerably devaluated. That is a matter of course, but we did 
not have an alternative and by way of the early launched privatisation, we 
markedly and initially left our former socialist rivals behind in the area of the 
import of capital.9 The early launch facilitated that massive privatisation in 
Hungary would be completed by 1996–1997, consequently, Hungarian economy 
became euro-conform, since the absolute predominance of private property 
was reified. “Soft” state property had been transformed into “hard” private 
property and the crucial process of the denationalisation of economy was 
completed.10 
  
 8 See, Stark, D.: Privatizáció Magyarországon. A tervtől a piachoz vagy a tervtől a 
klánig? (Privatisation in Hungary. From Planned Economy to Market Economy, or, from 
Planned Economy Back to Clans). Közgazdasági Szemle, 38 (1991) No. 9. It was primarily 
Mihály Tóth, who demonstrated that the majority of economic crime following the political 
transformation was committed via having recourse to state aid, which, as to its signi-
ficance, is followed by bankruptcy crime, whereas, explicit privatisational crime occurred 
relatively rarely. Nevertheless, public opinion takes an opposing viewpoint. Otherwise, 
simultaneously with drafting the Act on Business Associations, specific facts of the cases 
of economic crime were adopted in the Penal Code. See, Tóth, M: Piacgazdaság és a 
büntetőjog (Market Economy and Penal Law). Magyar Jog, 42 (1995) 641–646. 
 9 See, Diczházi, B.: A külföldi tőke szerepe a privatizációban (The Role of Foreign 
Capital in Privatisation). Budapest, 1997. Diczházi assesses this role basically in an 
affirmative manner, albeit, he naturally mentions the “colonising” investment of foreign 
capital with the exclusive objective of “market acquisition”. Nonetheless, without foreign 
capital, our major companies would have gone bankrupt, which would have incurred an 
enormous scale of unemployment. In Hungary, restructuring the economy and moderni-
sation of the structure of products were based on foreign capital. Obviously, adverse and 
negative tendencies also manifested themselves, such as the emergence of the so-called 
hawk-capital, etc. 
 10 See, Karsai, G.: “Nem tudták, de tették” (“They Were not Aware of What They were 
Doing”), and Bager, G.: A magyar privatizáció a pénzügyi ellenőrzés szempontjából 
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 We distributed and plundered public property, the heritage of workers and 
employees, some people would repeatedly assert. But that is glaring blunder. 
The Hungarian state had by no means possessed a venture capital of such an 
extent as that which was finally privatised. Unlawful state property, i.e., the 
confiscated fortunes of Duke Esterházy and Uncle Schwartz were privatised, 
the value of which must have rather diminished than increased during the 
system of planned economy. Namely, a considerable part of state assets at the 
end of the 1980s was non-working capital. En passant, national property has 
not disappeared, it transformed: state property transformed into private property. 
In my view, the assets of Peter Kovacs’ limited liability company also belong 
to the property of the nation, just as those of the former State Construction 
Company no. 43 did. The overwhelming majority of the assets deriving from 
foreign investment (with the exception of the dividend) also constitutes a part 
of the property of the nation, since foreign owners cannot transfer the hotel or 
the factory abroad, furthermore, they mostly employ Hungarian citizens, etc. 
 As to its social aspects, the process of privatisation was apparently not 
“mirthful”. Scilicet, the task seemed almost unfeasible, or, as the statement 
made by the Polish Lewandowski that became an adage assessed: unpossessed 
assets of unknown origin needed to be sold out to buyers, who were out of funds 
and who, by the way, did not want to purchase the stocks of losing state 
companies. State property needed to be erased at a time, when the supply was 
many times higher than the demand. Obviously, it was managed in a para-
mountly contradictory modus operandi, even if we disregard errors deriving 
from non-preparedness and ignorance.11 According to my estimates, privatisa-
                                                      
(Privatisation in Hungary from the Viewpoint of Financial Control). Both studies were 
published in the volume: Állami vagyon – privatizáció – gazdasági rendszerváltás (State 
Property–Privatisation–Economic Change of Regime). Budapest, 2005. 47–50 and 75–79. 
For a summary, see, Kovács, Á.–Bager, G.: Privatizáció Magyarországon (Privatisation in 
Hungary). 1–2, Budapest, 2004. Various economic assessments stated that the venture 
capital of the state in 1990 amounted to 2,400–2,500 million HUF, whereas, the number of 
the respective companies was 2000. Of course, no precise assessment of the assets was 
made. According to Ádám Török, the advance of Hungary in re transformation achieved at 
the beginning of the 1990s “could be attributed to more speedily implemented economic 
and legal reorganisation, to privatisation based on market relations that by large 
relinquished distribution techniques, to its favourable judgement in terms of international 
politics and to its auspicious geographical position.” Gazdaság Kelet-Közép-Európában 
1990–2006 (Economy in Central-Eastern-Europe between 1990–2006). História, 29 
(2007) No. 4. 
 11 See further, Voszka, É.: A privatizáció tizenöt éve és jövője (One and a Half 
Decades and the Future of Privatisation), and Az Állami vagyon – privatizáció – gazdasági 
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tion in Hungary approached the optimum attainable under the prevailing 
conditions up to a rate of three quarters, nevertheless, it must have offended 
the sense of justice of the society, since those who were in advantageous 
positions came off well. What must be recorded as the greatest achievement is 
that institutional privatisation could be completed so that we took second place 
subsequently to the Germans, thereby, we were past privatisation entailed by 
the political transformation.12 Following 1998, the issues under consideration 
related to privatisation in Hungary were already “bourgeois” issues, scilicet, 
we faced the following alternative: we either sustain a relatively powerful 
public sector with the decisive predominance of private property, like Austria 
and France, where besides public utility companies, the so-called strategic 
companies and associations that generate profit for the state coexist, or, we opt 
for the liberal way, which is characteristic of Scandinavia and the Benelux 
states, where merely the literally public utility companies are state-owned. In 
my view, the decision between the two approaches is dependant on the per-
formance of the state: if we are able to positively regulate, supervise and enforce 
compliance with the rules, conclude privatisation agreements safeguarded by 
adequate guarantees and de facto enforce these guarantees, then state property 
can be minimised, indeed. If, however, the regulation has loopholes, the 
agreements contain defaults and public administration can be corrupted, we 
will be better off with a more extensive state sector. This, however, is an issue 
of the actual economic policy, not of the change of regime.13 
                                                      
rendszerváltás (State Property–Privatisation–Economic Change of Regime). Budapest, 
2005, 36–37. 
 12 János Kornai qualified privatisation too accelerated as early as in 1989 and 
challenged its undervalued implementation. See, Kornai, J.: Indulatos röpirat a gazdasági 
átmenet ügyében (A Vehement Pamphlet in the Matter of Economic Transition). Budapest, 
1989. He upheld his viewpoint in his volume of studies: Szocializmus, kapitalizmus, 
demokrácia és rendszerváltás (Socialism, Capitalism, Democracy and the Change of 
Regime). He advised against “shock-therapy via privatisation” and deemed the rate of 
transformation to be out of measure (77–78). As for my view, I don't share his opinion: I 
contend that privatisation needed to be accomplished and stable property relations needed 
to be established the sooner the better, which, as a matter of course, entailed economic and 
social sacrifices. 
 13 Foreign special literature generally considered privatisation in Hungary to be highly 
successful, whereas, in Hungary, it rather met criticism. Certainly, privatisation that meets 
general satisfaction is impossible, undoubtedly, there have been erroneous dicisions, e.g., 
the process of privatisation lacked environmental audit for a long time and aspects of 
competition policy were also disregarded. Nonetheless, privatisation averted massive 
unemployment and the great majority of privatised companies proved to be operative in the 
long-run. 
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3. The denationalisation of Hungarian economy with respect to the proprietary 
structure substituted for the primitive accumulation of capital, which had 
undergone in Western-Europe a couple of centuries before. A great proportion 
of the private companies of Hungarian new-capitalism needed to originate in 
state property, since otherwise they could not have been established. Privati-
sation was substantiated by Hungarian business law drafted parallelly, which 
guaranteed an operative legal framework for the termination of the dominance 
of state property and for the formation and consolidation of market economy 
based on competition and private property. The criticisms that the statutes 
pertaining to privatisation were not faultless and that the application of the 
pertinent law was severely inconsistent are well-founded, but on the one hand, 
this could not be otherwise, since we were not following a beaten track, on the 
other hand, these faults remained within tolerable limits in comparison with 
other former socialist states. The faults were inevitable, since we were dealing 
with unfamiliar legal techniques, improvisation was necessary, and generally, 
legal regulation was formulated without the necessary economic bases, in 
defiance of significant political resistance and social-economic tensions. In this 
status quo, according to my view, the primary factor was that institutional 
privatisation was relatively rapidly implemented within the available legal 
framework. With reference to the title of a famous Italian film: privatisation has 
been accomplished, it’s time to forget about it.       
 The most severe criticism vis-a-vis law-making pertaining to privatisation 
(mainly in re the phase encompassing 1988–1990) was that it substantiated “the 
salvage of power by communists”, thereby, it thwarted a substantive political 
transformation. We will dwell upon that circumstantially later. Now we restrict 
ourselves to  noting that interim sociological research conducted primarily by 
Tamás Kolosi and Erzsébet Szalai have elucidated that the top-level party-
leadership of the Kádár-regime and the party-workers hardly acquired any 
property via privatisation.14 However, it was principally the (40–50-year-old) 
younger technocracy of the twilight of the Kádár-era, crucially the high- and 
middle-level management of companies and the economic leadership of the 
state apparatus that did acquire property. They, while cooperating with foreign 
capital and relying on the actors of Hungarian small-scale industry, of private 
trade and on small ventures, could become capitalists or retain their positions 
in the management as well as accede to further management positions. 
Disregarding some leading figures of the Alliance of Young Communists, 
we could hardly mention explicit party-workers among Hungarian major 
  
 14 See, Szalai, E.: Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban 
(Economic Elite and Society in the New-Capitalism of Hungary). Budapest, 2001. 37–41. 
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entrepreneurs and top managers. Of couse, the stratum of these technocrats and 
managers belonged to the nomenclature of the Kádár-regime, so far as they 
were accidentally also party-members, or, if they were independent, filling 
their positions was dependant on the consent of the respective party-organ. 
Nevertheless, this is valid with respect to the great majority of the so-called 
bourgeois political elite of the era following 1990, as well. In case of a 
peaceful transition and an evolutionary change of regime, which marked the 
Hungarian transformation, it was almost inevitable that the stratum of younger 
technocrats and managers, which was acknowledged by the West, spoke foreign 
languages and was familiar with the sciences of Western business management 
and organisation, could the most exploit the potentials of privatisation. The 
respective individuals can be only vaguely considered post-communists by reason 
of the recollection of their past, they are de facto new-capitalists or new capitalist 
managers. As to my view, “the real winners” of privatisation in Hungary were 
firstly, the foreign capital, especially major multi-national companies, secondly, 
former Hungarian company-management and the technocrat bureaucracy 
consisting of the economic leaders of the socialist state, thirdly, small-scale 
entrepreneurs possessing some capital (small-scale industry, retailers, workteam 
associations, complementary workshops of agricultural cooperatives), however, 
by no means the party-bureaucracy of the Kádár-regime. Which, I assume, in 
case of an evolutionary (and non-revolutionary) change of regime, was a nearly 
logical consequence of the Kádár-era in re its so-called goulash communism 
and soft dictatorship. 
 Could the transition have taken another track? Perhaps, we could have 
allocated company assets, stocks among people, which would have resulted in 
people’s stock-socialism instead of capitalism. People arguing for that are not 
aware of the basic realities of international politics, world-economy or of 
Hungary.15 What we need to add on the basis of the research of György Matolcsy 
and Péter Mihályi16 is that contrary to fallacies, the redistribution of state 
property was not principally implemented via privatisation and the application 
of the law concerning privatisation, but implicitly, via long-standing high 
  
 15 Sándor Kopátsy “contends” that state property should have been allocated among 
people. See, A magyar privatizáció stratégiája (The Strategy of Privatisation in Hungary). 
Central European Time, 1998. No. 6–7. 45–53. Cf., A comprehensive essay on the 
potentials of “democratic privatisation”: Mocsáry, J.: A dolgozói tulajdon Magyarországon. 
Múlt, jelen, jövő. A munkavállalói résztulajdon problémája (The Property of Employees in 
Hungary–Past, Present and Future–The Problem of the Employees’ Share), Budapest, 
1998. 
 16 See, Matolcsy, Gy.: Emlékeim a privatizációról (My Recollections of Privatisation). 
Central European Time, 1998. No. 6–7. 7–8., and Mihályi: op. cit. 125–130. 
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inflation, import-liberalisation, exchange-rate policies, bankruptcy waves, etc. 
Privatisation from the outset, undoubtedly also as an aftermath of the communi-
cation of the media, had become “the black sheep” of the change of regime, the 
scapegoat originating in the unfair and unethical enrichment of some, which 
appalled masses of people. We cannot assume that without privatisation we 
would have realised a form of capitalism that lacked rich people and capitalists.   
 Observing the political conflicts that have increasingly unravelled follow-
ing the mid-’90s and that the outraging passions related to the change of regime 
have not abated, but have led to scenes of civil war in Hungary, many basically 
contend that some strata of the society realised as late as the end of the 1990s 
that the broadly construed privatisation, which substituted the primitive 
accumulation of capital, had been accomplished and the new bourgeoisie had 
emerged, therefore, the structure of the social elite could be exclusively modified 
by the seizure of the acquired property of “winners”. In Spain and Portugal, the 
change of regime, which followed a fascist establishment structure, did not 
take the character of property acquisition, whereas, in former socialist states 
it did. Subsequently, “the losers” of the change of regime can merely acquire 
property by taking it away from “the winners”. The consequentially emerging 
political slogan has been that we demand a new, real change of regime and 
need to square accounts finally with the post-communist elite that had salvaged 
its power. For some, redistribution would imply a dream come true, however, 
a change of regime in the property structure cannot be implemented and “bad 
capitalists” cannot be replaced for “good capitalists” within the system of 
capitalism every 20 years.17 Such a replacement can at most be effected by the 
market via its intangible instruments. 
 
4. Privatisation in Hungary commenced essentially spontaneously, since we 
were not swept into privatisation by a central decision of the state, but by tax-
remitting and organisational restructuring transactions of the managers of 
major companies and by the improvisational utilisation of the power-vacuums 
that gave way after such transactions. Namely, the idea of privatisation had not 
even emerged during the drafting of Act 6 of 1988 on Business Associations 
(hereinafter: ABA). 
 The so-called spontaneous privatisation was received by inconceivably 
relentless criticism in Hungarian social science literature. According to Rudolf 
Tőkés, during the settlement of political problems, the communist elite 
transformed state-owned companies into management-owned ones and by 
  
 17 See also, Kulcsár, K.: Az új politikai rendszer és a magyar valóság (The New 
Political System and Hungarian Reality). Budapest, 2006. 27. 
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exploiting defects in law, the inner circle of the managing elite fraudulently 
peculated via unfair profits the joint ventures established with the participation 
of Western investors. Concurrent business law facilitated the self-privatisation 
of state property, therefore, “artful vigilants” with appropriate relations could 
become billionaires.18 As Sándor Kopátsy formulates: “The policy, as a con-
sequence of which state property was consigned primarily to foreign ownership, 
so that at the same time an incredibly large domestic state-debt was generated 
and some have made revolting fortunes, while two-thirds of the population 
today live at a substantially lower standard and more hopelessly than they did 
in the final decade of the failed socialist regime, is to be considered a crime 
against the Hungarian society.”19 According to Tamás Fricz, the elite of the 
former party-state and the members of its nomenclature enjoyed the benefits of 
spontaneous privatisation and therefore, “...the transition to market, or, if you 
please, capitalist relations had been implemented by the political and economic 
elite of the Kádár-regime in Hungary, wherefore, the economic leaders of state 
socialism became the managers of capitalist private property.”20 
 At the same time, as Éva Voszka claims, in our days it is unequivocal that 
facts contradict “the frustrated political charge that the nomenclature has 
salvaged itself”.21 Furthermore, Péter Mihályi expressly states that spontaneous 
privatisation is “the most deceptive term” for the description of privatisation in 
Hungary.22 Its principal purpose is the pursuit of a publicity campaign against 
non-fellow post-communists, the grudging lament of those left without fortune, 
which goes under the slogan: “my state property is just being misappropriated 
by others, unfortunately, not by me”. However, as Árpád Kovács clearly 
demonstrated on the basis of the examinations of the State Audit Office, the 
decisive majority of the transactions related to privatisation in 1989–1990 had 
been lawful.23 
 Nevertheless, we should observe the facts. Act 28 of 1987 permitted that 
expressly domestic legal entities, that is, state-owned companies established 
joint-stock companies or limited liability companies pursuant to the Commercial 
Code of 1875, whereas, the Ministry of Finance guaranteed quite significant 
  
 18 See, Tőkés, R.: A kialkudott forradalom (The Haggled Revolution). Budapest, 1998. 
345–384. 
 19 See, Kopátsy: A magyar privatizáció stratégiája. op. cit. 47. 
 20 See, Fricz, T.: Az árok két oldalán (On Opposite Sides of the Ditch). Budapest, 2006. 68. 
 21 See, Voszka, É.: Spontán privatizáció Magyarországon (Spontaneous Privatisation 
in Hungary). Budapest, 1998. 137. 
 22 Cf., Mihályi: op. cit. 98. 
 23 Cf., Kovács, Á.: Számvetés a számvetésről (An Account on Accounts). Kurtán, S.–
Sándor, P–Vass, L. (ed.): Magyarország évtizedkönyve. Budapest, 1998. 197.  
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profit tax-allowances for new commercial associations for three years under 
new taxation law. At the initiation of the management of Medicor and Ganz 
Danubius companies, the management of major companies launched the 
transformation of the factory units of the companies into associations and of 
these corporate centres into holdings for asset administration. Thereby, they 
did not intend to privatise these companies, but endeavoured partly to gain tax-
allowances in the interest of their liquidity and partly to modernise the internal 
organisational and operational mechanisms of the companies according to 
Western models. Therefore, this “internal reorganisation into associations” had 
ensued before the adoption of ABA (and since the Commercial Code of 1875 
stipulated more liberal rules than the future ABA, the management of major 
companies had positively endeavoured to take action before ABA took effect 
on 1st January, 1989 as the data of the Registry Court clearly demonstrate!). 
Besides, these transactions implied at most de jure privatisation, scilicet, they 
can be merely described as “pseudo-privatisation” as Mária Móra formulated 
as early as in 1991.24 
 Before the spring of 1989, the management of major companies had 
essentially intended to rationalise, not to privatise, since financial regulations 
expressly motivated them to proceed so. Therefore, the transactions of 1987–
1988 can at most be assessed as the non-conscious preparation of privatisation, 
in substance, however, these had been financial-organisational routine opera-
tions.25 During the spring of 1989, when it could be anticipated that the political 
transformation was well within reach, the management of major companies 
united in the Hungarian Economic Chamber elaborated the conception of 
privatisation, the purpose of which consisted in the subjection of the established 
associations to “partial” privatisation. The scope of this partial privatisation 
encompassed: a) so much as possible, the involvement of foreign and professional 
minority investors, which could potentially effect capital increase, and thereby, 
the acquisition of surplus capital, b) clearance of the debts of the respective 
companies via the transfer of debts to the state in return for shares and via the 
conversion of bank liabilities to stocks, c) the nomination of the management 
of companies (and to a smaller extent of employees via employee stocks) to 
joint proprietors, d) the conveyance of “left-over” stocks to partner companies, 
  
 24 Cf., Móra, M.: Az állami vállalatok (ál)privatizációja [The (Pseudo-)Privatisation of 
State-Owned Companies]. Közgazdasági Szemle, 38 (1991) No. 6. 
 25 Cf., Mihályi, P.: A gazdaság államtalanítása 1988–1998 (The Denationalisation of 
Economy between 1988–1998). In: Kurtán–Sándor–Vass (ed.): Magyarország évtized-
könyve, op. cit. 164. 
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so that companies and banks assisted one another by cross shares in the 
implementation of privatisation.  
 In essence, this conception drew on the system of the self-governance of 
companies introduced in the state sector in 1984. A contributor to the elabora-
tion of the conception, Ádám Angyal explicitly contended that in 1990, the 
state property in companies was at most 20 p.c, which was equivalent to the 
starting capital that the state allocated to companies upon the introduction of 
corporate governance. The so-called self-governing companies managed by 
boards of directors were de facto no longer state companies and the companies 
themselves needed to decide voluntarily on their transformation into associa-
tions and on privatisation. If privatisation did ensue, managers and employees 
were due proprietors’ shares. The state could also privatise companies under 
so-called state-management, in which state property equalled at least 20 p.c., 
whereas, it could merely exercise supervision over the privatisation of self-
governing state companies via public authority instruments and could receive 
cca. 20 p.c. of the revenues deriving from privatisation. If we view this 
conception objectively, it by no means implied spontaneous privatisation within 
the scope of self-governing–self-managing state companies, but voluntary 
and decentralised privatisation based on the decision of the company 
reached in the spirit of corporate autonomy pursuant to State Company Act 
(Act 6 of 1977 as amended in 1984).  
 Concurrently with the elaboration of this conception in 1989, the resourceful 
researchers of the Financial Research Share Company, mainly under the 
leadership of György Matolcsy, launched the so-called privatisation of non-
capital contribution and various company evacuation and redoubling trans-
actions.26 In many cases, these did not mean privatisation and promoted the 
foreclosure of the law pertaining to the privatisation of small businesses, 
nevertheless, by reason of the absurdities of capital assessment, they necessarily 
involved the possibility of abuse. Therefore, law-making needed to partly 
guarantee the state control over acts of partial privatisation (e.g., sales of real 
estates), partly draft the regulation of the reorganisation of state-owned 
companies into associations. 
 The conception of the management of major companies was by that time 
opposed by the aligning ideologists of central economic management, such as 
The Office of Economic Planning, the financial portfolio, the central issueing 
bank and by reputed reform economists–in a peculiar manner, all of them–rew 
  
 26 György Matolcsy argued for voluntary company privatisation in several articles in 
1989–90. Cf., e.g., Matolcsy, Gy.: A spontán tulajdonreform védelmében (In Defence of 
Spontaneous Property Reform). Külgazdaság, 35 (1990) No. 3. 
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on the (Stalinist) political doctrine of the unified and indivisible state property. 
Actually, real financial reasons accounted for the intervention: the privatisated 
equivalent could not remain in the property of companies by reason of 
impending insolvency. Therefore, the self-privatisation of companies needed 
to be prevented. Nonetheless, as it was manifest in former documents of the 
Financial Research Institute, they had no actual conceptions either concerning 
the required manner of the reorganisation of state-owned companies into 
associations, or concerning the structure of state ownership to be established.27 
Besides, state-controlled privatisation, as the pertinent law of 1992 demon-
strates, could have been launched exclusively via the dissolution of corporate 
governance and management. However, the express declaration of this was 
shunned both by government commissioners entrusted with the task (István 
Tömpe and János Martonyi) and by their theoretical supporters (László Antal 
on the part of the Secretariat of Economic Policy of the Council of Ministers), 
György Surányi (under-secretary of state at the National Planning Office) and 
Lajos Bokros (Hungarian National Bank). Their disposition was prudent, since 
corporate governance had considerable social support.28 
 In this situation, the leadership of the Ministry of Justice with the support of 
the concurrent Prime Minister, Miklós Németh decided that while maintaining 
the prevailing corporate governance and management, it would amend the 
State Company Act, so that the voluntary privatisation of state-owned companies 
dependant on the decision of the company would be permitted under increased 
state control within the purview of a unified, market-oriented Act on Reorgani-
sation. Thereby, law-making resigned the coercive transformation of companies 
(as Kálmán Kulcsár in his ministerial statement emphatically asserted: the 
pertinent law concerns reorganisation, not transformation), therefore, the 
decision on reorganisation at companies under state control was to be made by 
central organs of state administration, whereas, at self-governing and self-
managing companies, the decision on reorganisation lay with corporate organs. 
The respective statute also established a legal technique of transformation, 
which did not necessitate two-graded privatisation, since reorganisation could 
  
 27 Cf., Lengyel, L. (ed.): A tulajdon reformja (Property Reform). Pénzügykutató Rt., 
Budapest, 1988. Csillag, I. (ed.): A társasági törvény, a tulajdonreform és az átalakulás 
kérdései (The Act on Business Associations, Property Reform and Issues of the Trans-
formation). Budapest, 1988. 
 28 We must note that the conception of corporate management started to gain ground in 
the Soviet Union at that time. See, Pethő, R.: Törvény a Szovjetunióban a dolgozói kol-
lektívákról (Law Pertaining to Employees’ Collectives in the Soviet Union). Magyar Jog, 
34 (1987) No. 1. This also provided political support to the backers of corporate autonomy. 
158 TAMÁS SÁRKÖZY 
  
simultaneously constitute a process of privatisation. Therefore, the Act on 
Reorganisation was based on the maintenance of the former status quo. 
 Furthermore, Act 13 of 1989 on Reorganisation (hereinafter: AR) established 
complicated distribution rules and intended to grant a share to each party. 
These rules were designed to be experimental by the law-maker (it prescribed a 
revision after two years), furthermore, it made the majority of rules optional, 
namely, it was facilitated that the state holding organ and the company agreed 
on different rules within a specific term. The modus vivendi is well-demonstrated 
by the regulations below:  
 – the prerequisite of reorganisation was capital increase (outsider investors 
needed to increase the value of company assets at least by 20 p.c. or by 
100 million HUF, therefore, the involvement of outsider investors was 
required, so that pseudo-privatisation could be precluded), 
 – 20 p.c. of the company assets calculated on the basis of the balance 
sheet belonged to the state (the state holding organisation), 
 – so that the financial basis of local governments to be formed could be 
secured, on grounds of the location of the estate, the respective local 
council (following 1990, the local government) was due an associational 
share equivalent to the value of the inner settlement estates as listed in 
the company balance sheet (obviously, the full value was to be considered 
and not the value decreased by company liabilities, as the State Property 
Agency endeavoured to interpret it later in the interest of the increase of 
central state revenues),  
 – the issuance of employees’ stocks for employees was obligatory at a 
value of up to 10 p.c. of the capital stock of the association, 
 – the rest of the assets could be sold to outsider investors, so that 80 p.c. 
of the equivalent revenues were due to the state holding organ and 20 
p.c. could be retained by the company within the scope of assets beyond 
the capital stock (the so-called privatisational equivalent quota: PEQ), 
 – the association share that could not be sold could be retained by the 
association as a so-called own share.29 
 I dwelt on the above more circumstantially, because these amply demonstrate 
the desperate attempt of the law-maker to temper people’s moods in the spirit 
  
 29 Concerning the Act on Reorganisation, see, Sárközy, T.: Egy törvény védelmében I–
II. (In Defence of an Act: Parts 1–2). Figyelő, 1989. When I generalised the conception 
unfolding in AR, I was considering such a plural proprietary structure, in which not only 
the property of business associations, but also the self-managing property and settlement 
assets have a role. See, Sárközy, T.: A tulajdonreformról a társasági törvény után (On 
Property Reform Following the Act on Business Associations). Budapest, 1989. 
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of the principle of “live and let live”, so that each party received a share. 
Nevertheless, by the spring and summer of 1989, people had the impulsion to 
come to grips, all of them wished to dispose of the whole of the property. 
Although, the emphasis on the technical features of AR indignified all, AR 
was not challenged by reason of the fact that it accomplished a covert property 
reform, on the contrary, it was impugned, since it did not implement the property 
reform, which would have favoured its critics. As Kálmán Kulcsár stated in the 
introduction of the act, the starting point of AR was the prevailing status quo 
and “it did not even by an inch increase the formerly guaranteed entitlements 
of companies to dispose of property” (but it did not reduce them, either).  
 The attack against AR was led by Lajos Bokros on the part of the reform 
circles of the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, who, while undimensionally 
exaggerated the problem, described spontaneous privatisation as a dead end of 
the complete change of regime. He further dared the absurd statement that “the 
elite of corporate and economic management” (?) and “the ambitious new elite” 
reached a modus vivendi on the acquisition of public property disregarding the 
majority of society,30 albeit, as György Szoboszlai correctly stated concerning 
the so-called decentralised privatisation, basically, the battle between the “old” 
apparatus of economic management and the “old” corporate management was 
at issue,31 in which the bourgeois opposition got involved primarily by reason 
of the elections.32 
 Nevertheless, political attack was unvariably directed against AR, albeit, 
beyond estate manipulations, 95 p.c. of the cases that presumably involved 
abuse occurred via the application of the Commercial Code or ABA. The mere 
protraction of the concurrent proceedings of the Registry Court did not allow 
for considerable pre-election abuses via the implementation of AR, which took 
effect on 1st July, 1989. Furthermore, by January 1990, pursuant to Acts 7 and 
8 of 1990, the State Property Agency, a special publicly financed organ 
established for the management of state property as a Hungarian Treuhand was 
  
 30 See, Bokros, L.: Rendszerváltás vakvágányon (The Change of Regime on Tail Track). 
In: Kurtán, S.–Sándor, P.–Vass, L. (ed.): Magyarország politikai évkönyve. Budapest, 
1990. 72–78. 
 31 Cf., Szoboszlai, Gy.: A rendszerváltás jogállama (The State Founded on the Rule of 
Law during the Change of Regime), in the collection of studies: Bayer, J.–Kovch, I. 
(szerk.): A kritikus leltár. A rendszerváltás másfél évtizede (A Critical Inventory). 
Budapest, 2005. 24. 
 32 See, Tőkés, R.: “For the purposes of their campaigns, both the Hungarian Democrats’ 
Forum and the Alliance of Free Democrats opposed that the insider management elite 
misappropriated the state-owned industrial, commercial and supplier companies by way of 
privatisation.” In: Tőkés: op. cit. 384. 
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finally founded, furthermore, state control over acts of privatisation construed 
in a broader scope effected by corporate governance and management (such as 
estate transactions, contributions in kind, etc.) was also established (obligatory 
registration, authorisation and the right of veto, etc.). Albeit, certain partial 
elements failed, such as a market-based act on accountancy for the purposes of 
the assessment of assets, we can assert that by the spring of 1990, the institu-
tional system of voluntary, decentralised and state controlled privatisation 
based on corporate decisions had been established in Hungary, which, 
according to my opinion, would have been completely operative in Hungary 
within a few years. Assumably, Hungary would have been the only Central-
Eastern-European country (in other former socialist countries, in the absence 
of corporate autonomy from the outset, merely centralised, state-controlled 
privatisation could be implemented), in which by reason of the institutionali-
sation of corporate governance and management in the mid-1980s, such a form 
of privatisation could have been accomplished, which would have been based 
on the primacy of voluntary and decentralised privatisation in case of medium- 
and smaller-scale companies. Crucial companies of strategic importance, which 
were by all means or could have been controlled by state administration, would 
have been privatised by the state, whereas, the “self-privatisation” of small- 
and medium-scale companies could have been subjected to proper legality 
control by the state. 
 
5. This solution was not implemented, which had several political and 
economic reasons. One of these was the inordinate defamation of decentralised 
privatisation based on corporate decisions by the mass media and public 
sentiment and its substantive identification with crime, abuse and communist 
salvage of power. The other reason was that the circle of the supporters of 
bourgeois parties that had got into power could be assigned to positions in the 
economic management merely via interventions by central state administra-
tion, which was unfeasible at companies, therefore, privatisation needed to be 
centralised by the state. Actually, privatisation based on corporate decisions 
did favour company management and the employees of more profitable 
companies with greater economic power vis-a-vis other strata of society, such 
as civil servants, retired or young people. 
 Such a privilege of those in advantageous positions was unacceptable for a 
considerable part of the society, disregarding the fact, that decentralised 
privatisation would have precluded reprivatisation and infringed the interests 
of “the losers” of socialist nationalisations. (It is another issue that compen-
sation finally did not occur, nevertheless, those concerned had not known that 
at that phase.) The apparatus of the organs of economic management also 
 POST-SOCIALIST “PRIMITIVE ACCUMULATION OF CAPITAL” AND THE LAW 161 
  
appreciated their transfer from positions in “normal public administration” to 
much more yielding positions created at privatisational organs. 
 On the other hand, corporate governance can function as an organic part of 
democratic socialism, nevertheless, it is inevitably anacronistic in a consistent 
capitalist system. Namely, corporate governance was simply nonsense for 
Western investors (this was even more manifest in Yugoslavia and its successor 
states). This corporate structure could accommodate only those professional 
investors that had had long-standing commercial-cooperational relations with 
the companies of the socialist states, whereas, it deterred financial investors. 
Major Western banks and multinational companies (and the adjacent gigantic 
audit-counselling concerns, major law firms) intended to negotiate with the 
state itself, but not with corporate management. Apparently, by reason of the 
enormous domestic and foreign state debts, Government did not intend to share 
the privatisational equivalent with any party, not in the least degree with 
corporate management, thereby, it demanded the complete revenue deriving 
from privatisation for itself. Such a disposition of the then Government was 
strongly supported by the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.  
 At the same time, decentralised privatisation described as spontaneous 
underwent de facto in such a small scale that if communists had based their 
power on that, the successor party could have hardly won the elections in 1994. 
Therefore, the communist salvage of power based on spontaneous privatisation 
is mere fiction. Unequivocal data supplied by György Matolcsy, Éva Voszka 
and Péter Mihályi show that at most 2 p.c. of the venture capital of the state 
that could be privatised was affected by a legal form of privatisation based 
on company decisions (at cca. 150 companies).33 Mihályi further adds that 
“considering their proportions, negative examples between 1988–1990 had 
been not more numerous than between 1990–1992 or in any subsequent three 
years’ period.”34 
 Did abuses occur? Yes, they did, however, 
 a) they were not committed on grounds of AR, 
 b) it was ABA that substantiated the abuses, nevertheless, if ABA had not 
been in force, the number and scale of abuses would have been even greater 
pursuant to the Commercial Code of 1875. The majority of presumed abuses 
were associated with the privatisation of contributions in kind and company 
  
 33 See, Matolcsy, Gy.: Lábadozásunk évei (The Years of Our Convalescence). Buda-
pest, 1991. 227–229., Voszka, É.: Spontán privatizáció Magyarországon (Spontaneous 
Privatisation in Hungary). Budapest, 1998. 130–145., Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció 
krónikája. op. cit. 98–102.  
 34 Cf., Mihályi: A magyar privatizáció krónikája. op. cit. 100. 
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evacuation, not with general privatisation, but with those transactions affecting 
retail industry and catering trade companies concentrated in co-operatives that 
preceded Act 76 of 1990 on the Privatisation of Commercial, Service, Hotel 
and Catering Businesses [the so-called Act on Small (Pre-)Privatisation].35 
Another area of abuse was constituted by matters related to the assets of the 
Communist Party (Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party) and of the associated 
social organisations (such as the Alliance of Young Communists and the 
Alliance of Pioneers), which, however, were beyond the scope of legislation 
concerning privatisation by the state. (The issue of the assets of the Communist 
Party designated to be inherited by the Hungarian Socialist Party had been 
transferred to the political portfolio during the so-called Round-Table-Negotia-
tions, which had paved the way for the political transformation, therefore, it 
was not dealt with during the codification of business law.)  
 As a matter of course, objective assessments of the spontaneous (de-
centralised) privatisation were written as early as in the 1990s, as well. György 
Matolcsy, the under-secretary of state responsible for economic-policy under 
the Antall-Government formulated the followings: “Spontaneous privatisation 
belongs to the heritage of the Hungarian path. It is the logical product of self-
destruction and the result of a permissive policy in lieu of aggression. Its 
spontaneous character was rendered by the fact that it was the corporate 
management that initiated reorganisation and riddance from state property. Of 
course, this entailed the salvage of former positions, which was the specific 
way of escape. The real import of spontaneous privatisation consisted in the 
fact that it prepared real privatisation.”36 According to Matolcsy, the minor 
amendments of former law effected by the Antall-Government in the summer 
of 1990 were designed to soothe the mood and temper of the new parties in 
Government: “Eventually, the amendments did not modify substantially the 
legal framework of privatisation. Although, they reinforced the state control of 
privatisation and guaranteed the state more powerful influence on privati-
sation, they did not rechannel former processes or obstruct former paths.”37 A 
similarly objective assessment was rendered by Tibor Pongrácz, the political 
under-secretary of state of the Antall-Government (and the Chairman of the 
  
 35 The draft of the Act on Small (Pre-)Privatisation was ready in the autumn of 1989, 
but according to the demand of the parties in opposition, it was only adopted by 
Government presided by József Antall. In the meantime, the number of businesses to be 
privatised had decreased by several thousand, since the practical ones had taken action, 
before the act took effect.  
 36 See, Matolcsy, Lábadozásunk évei. op. cit. 27.  
 37 See, ibid. 103.  
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Board of Directors of the Hungarian Privatisation and State Holding Company 
in 1997), albeit, he exaggerated the scale of spontaneous privatisation: “These 
statutes adopted in 1988 and 1989 … (ABA and AR, sic) … did actually 
guarantee the most consequential prerequisite of bourgeois transformation, since 
they legitimised private enterprises and did not restrict foreign investment. 
Nevertheless, they did not provide for the protection of state property and no 
parallel law pertaining to the protection of assets related to privatisation was 
drafted.” Pongrácz is correct, however, the time for parallel law-making was 
very limited. But we should follow the train of thought of Pongrácz: “There-
fore, the opposition assumed that the purposes of the pertinent statutes were 
the salvage of power, i.e., the conversion of political power into economic 
power. We allow that in the period of spontaneous privatisation many unethical 
and perhaps legally contestable cases occurred, therefore, we can rightly 
condemn it. Nonetheless, if we view the process in its completeness and from a 
historical perspective, we can affirm a great deal of it, since what already 
within the framework of the communist regime did commence were the 
establishment of private enterprises, the deconstruction of unprofitable and 
futureless state property and the irreversible conversion to real market 
economy... For the former elite that had abandoned its political and economic 
positions, such gaining ground by entrepreneurs, which ensued in many waves, 
opened up opportunities for escape and according to some experts, that 
explains why the former elite did not even consider violent intervention against 
the change of regime.”38 
 
6. Subsequently to the free elections in the spring of 1990 and the formation 
of the centre-right Antall-Government, minor legal amendments were effected 
and for some time, the basically self-initiated decentralised privatisation of 
companies continued, although, governmental control was more powerful and 
the active involvement of the State Property Agency into privatisation also 
increased. Act 76 of 1990 on privatisation in commerce and catering trade (the 
so-called Act on Small (Pre-)Privatisation) was promulgated. For some time, 
under the changed political circumstances, the management of companies 
seemed to acknowledge the increase of the power of the State Property Agency 
and agreed on a modus vivendi with its leadership, according to which, Ferenc 
Mádl, a minister without a portfolio supervised privatisation, his deputy was 
János Martonyi (the former government commissioner of the Németh-Govern-
ment responsible for privatisation), whereas, the managing director of the State 
  
 38 Pongrácz, T.: Privatizáció és kárpótlás (Privatisation and Compensation). In: Magyar-
ország a XX. században (Hungary in the 20th Century), Vol. 3., Szekszárd, 1997. 678–682.  
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Property Agency was Lajos Csepi, a director of the former Price Control 
Authority. In this respect, Erzsébet Szalai notes correctly that the so-called 
Kupa-Programme actually acquiesced in decentralised privatisation.39 At the 
same time, Buyout by Corporate Management combined with the so-called 
Employees’ Share Scheme had a growing significance, the latter of which was 
politically supported by government parties, as well.40 Although, the so-called 
Government Theses titled “Property and Privatisation” written by Bertalan 
Diczházi and György Matolcsy in August, 1990 in principle objected to 
spontaneous privatisation and corporate governance, it reprehended privati-
sational “shock-therapy” and intended to provide a wide range of property for 
investors. According to the Theses, “the first wave” of privatisation would 
consist in active privatisation implemented by the State Property Agency, the 
second wave of privatisation would be launched by companies, whereas, the 
third wave would have been a peculiar take-over, when outsider investors could 
have contested the insider corporate management. Nevertheless, the latter 
alternative was not realised. Meanwhile, Act 76 of 1990 was being implemented 
and the considerable merits of the statute, disregarding all its contradictions, 
included that by cca. 1994, almost the entire segment of retail and catering 
trades had been transferred into private property and the majority was held by 
Hungarian individual proprietors, furthermore, the act had been implemented 
not by way of distribution, but in an open framework of market-based 
competition.41 Nevertheless, since the removal of former corporate manage-
ment had failed in the summer and autumn of 1990, a political decision was 
made in 1992 on the liquidation of corporate governance and management at 
state-owned companies, therefore, the coercive transformation of these companies 
was to be effected pursuant to Acts 53–54–55 of 1992. Furthermore, in 1992–
93, the financial empowerment of political supporters was an increasing 
endeavour, which manifested itself in Small Investment and Existential-Credit 
  
 39 See, Szalai, E.: Gazdasági elit és társadalom a magyarországi újkapitalizmusban. 
op. cit. 79–80. Mihály Kupa as the Minister of Finance of the Antall-Government 
propagated this as a programme of economic-policy at the turn of 1990/1991.  
 40 See, Boda, D.–Neumann, L.: MRP és MBO a hazai privatizációban (“Employees’ 
Share Scheme and Buyout by Corporate Management Programmes in Hungarian Privati-
sation”), Budapest, 1998. 69–81.; Karsai, J.: Management Buyout külföldön és itthon 
(Management Buyout in Hungary and Abroad). Külgazdaság, 37 (1993) No. 2.; Boda, D.–
Hovorka, J.–Neumann, L.: A munkavállalók, mint a privatizált vállalatok új tulajdonosai 
(Employees as New Proprietors of Privatised Companies). Közgazdasági Szemle, 41 (1994) 
1084–1096.  
 41 See, Karsai, G.: A fogyasztási cikk kereskedelem privatizációja (Privatisation of the 
Retail of Consumer Goods), Budapest, 1993.  
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Programmes, etc. In 1992, a separate statute, Act 44 of 1992 on the Employees’ 
Share Scheme was enacted, which was based on the principles of the American 
ESOP Programme (Employees’ Stock Ownership Programme).42 
  
7. In 1992, three pertinent statutes were adopted, such as Act 53 of 1992 on 
the Management and Utilisation of Venture Capital to Be Retained in Long-
Term State Ownership, Act 54 of 1992 on the Sale, Utilisation and Protection 
of Provisionally State-Owned Assets and Act 55 of 1992 on the Promulgation 
of Acts 53 and 54 of 1992 and on Consequential Legal Amendments.43 
 In this legal framework (the drafting of which was supervised by Béla 
Bártfai), the basically new element was rendered under the act on venture 
capital to be retained in state property for a long term, within the purview of 
which, state-owned companies as institutions were dissolved via their reorgani-
sation into business associations and the persisting state-owned companies 
were also obligated to operate as business associations (the overwhelming 
majority of them as joint-stock companies and less than 10 p.c. as limited 
liability companies). Pursuant to the act, a market-conform management-system 
was applied at persisting state-owned companies, i.e., these business associations 
were subordinated to the State Holding Company (Limited by Shares). The 
State Holding Company functioned as the one-entity joint-stock company of 
Government.  
 The underlying conception was the unlimited nature of the power of the 
state as a proprietor: Accordingly, state-owned companies are the objects of 
state property, therefore, they neither have rights, nor earning assets (in a 
departing manner from the former regulation) vis-a-vis the proprietor. These 
statutes generally refer to venture capital, never to companies, therefore, the 
guarantees of corporate governance and management and of autonomy 
established back in 1977 were eliminated. 
 Neither the venture capital of the state was precisely defined, in the same 
manner, nor the scope of the companies to be retained in long-term state 
ownership were itemised, although, Article 2 of Act 53 of 1992 specified some 
  
 42 Concerning the Programme titled “Kisbefektetőket a tőzsdére mindenáron” (“Small 
Investors to the Stock Exchange at All Costs”), announced in 1992, see, Korányi: op. cit. 
46. On the programme of “stock purchase” free of charge by small investors (practically 
for free, via the utilisation of compensation vouchers), see, Vanicsek, M.: Elosztásos priva-
tizáció (Privatisation by Allocation). Budapest, 1998. 44–49. Concerning the Existential-
Credit Programme and subsidies for domestic smallholders, see, Gidai, A.: Kedvezményes 
privatizációs technikák (Techniques of Preferential Privatisation). Budapest, 1998. 63–66.  
 43 For commentaries on the acts, see, Sárközy, T. (ed.): Átalakulás és a privatizáció 
(Reorganisation and Privatisation). Budapest, 1994.  
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general features. On grounds of the statute, Government Decree no. 126 of 
1992 (VIII. 20.) and its Supplements itemised the respective companies, scilicet, 
a share of cca. 35–40 p.c. of the state-owned sector, including the so-called 
crucial companies of the state, the inner core. An endeavour of the State 
Holding Company (Limited by Shares) was to shun the limitations stipulated 
under ABA, according to the view of Jenő Czuczai, it intended to function as a 
corporation under public law (cf., the French model), nonetheless, this collided 
with effective law, furthermore, the Constitutional Court under its Decision no. 
33/1993 (IV. 15.) AB also annulled the provisions of Act 53 that established 
unnecessary exceptions.44 
 Law pertaining to privatisation adopted in 1992 maintained the State Property 
Agency as a central organ of privatisation. Corporate governance and manage-
ment was terminated at companies designed to be privatised, thereby, companies 
were subjected to coercive transformation into business associations. Never-
theless, privatisation was not incorporated into the process of reorganisation, 
as it had been in 1989, but reorganisation into an association ensued first, 
and only then was privatisation effected as a “sellout” by the State Property 
Agency: it sold the state-owned shares in business associations. 
 Within the purview of the above-mentioned three statutes, all the companies 
falling under the effect of the Company Act of 1977 dissolved between 
1992–1995 with the exception of about 20–30 companies under liquidation 
or full settlement: state-owned companies were reorganised into associations. 
All this took place under state direction, and subsequently, privatisation was 
also subordinated exclusively to state decisions. The decisions on privatisation 
reached by the State Property Agency were only to a minor extent determined 
by normative conditions (neither had been Capital Policy Directives formulated 
except for one), in general, uniform solutions were applied and the absence 
of normative conditions were meant to be rectified by wide-scale competition 
procedures. Nevertheless, the further implementation of privatisation was 
basically and unvariably market-based, albeit, “preferential procedures” (such 
  
 44 Concerning the practice of privatisation between 1992–94, see, Czuczai, J.: A ma-
gyar privatizáció alulnézetből. Múltja, jelene, jövője (Javaslat egy új liberális gazdaság-
politikának megfelelő privatizációs jogi szervezeti-intézményei koncepcióra) [Privatisation 
in Hungary from the Bottom-View. Its Past–Present–Future (Proposal for a Legal Organi-
sational–Institutional Conception of Privatisation that Conforms to New Liberal Economic 
Policy)]. Budapest, 1994. 29–37. 
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as privatisational leasing as a new technique) were adopted at a growing 
extent.45  
 The situation related to privatisation between 1992–1994 became both from 
political and economic points of view considerably strained. The reorgani-
sation of companies into business associations had established the sine qua non 
of privatisation, however, privatisation per se advanced very slowly. The 
actually valuable capital was possessed by the State Holding Company (Limited 
by Shares), the management of which (Count Pál Teleki and Szabolcs Szeke-
res), having returned from the USA, intended to operate their portfolio as a real 
monetary holding, which provoked the anger of populist radical politicians.46 
Nevertheless, populist programmes directed at “the support of little man” gave 
one after the other ground. The tasks of the implementation of massive privati-
sation, the sellout of the “inner core” (Péter Mihályi) and the conclusion of 
the process of institutional privatisation awaited the future socialist-liberal 
Government, which were substantiated by Act 39 of 1995, the so-called 
uniform act on privatisation.          
 The draft of the uniform act on privatisation in line with a number of other 
drafts designed to promote the work of new Government had been formulated 
by 1993 in the Institute of Political and Legal Sciences of the Hungarian 
Academy of Sciences,47 and having been adjusted to the Government 
Programme, they were handed over by September, 1994 by the Codification 
Committee consisting of István Csillag, Gábor Komáromi and Tamás Sárközy 
to the Minister of Finance and to Ferenc Bartha, the respective government 
commissioner. The state administrative negotiations concerning the draft law 
and the parliamentary debate of the Bill took more than half a year by reason 
of prevailing political conflicts and the delay was also influenced by the 
replacement of Ministers of Finance, i.e., of Békesi by Bokros and by the 
appointment of Tamás Suchmann to Minister of Privatisation. Eventually, the 
  
 45 Juhász, I.–Vigh, I.: A privatizációs lízingtechnika kézikönyve (A Manual for the 
Technique of Privatisational Leasing). Budapest, 1993.  
 46 See, more amply, Hoóz, T.: Az ÁV Rt. mozgási szabadsága a privatizációs törvények 
tükrében (The Scope for Action of the State Holding Company As Reflected by the Acts on 
Privatisation). Gazdaság és Jog, 1 (1993) No. 2–3.; Komlós, J.: Vezetői kivásárlás (MBO) 
(Management Buyout). Budapest, 1993.; Mellár, T.: Vállalati átalakulások és a privatizáció 
(Company Reorganisations and Privatisation). In: Bródy András ünnepi kötet (Memorial 
Volume Dedicated to András Bródy). Budapest, 1994. 246–268.; Voszka, É.: Az agyag-
lábakon álló óriás (The Giant on Clay Legs). Budapest, 1995.  
 47 See, Sárközy, T.: Javaslat a piacgazdaságot szolgáló modern kormányzás felépíté-
sére (Proposal for the Establishment of Modern Government Promoting Market Economy). 
Budapest, 1994.  
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basic structure and the basic principles of the draft law could be maintained, 
and in the spring of 1995, the uniform act on privatisation was adopted.48 
 AP also created the uniform organisation for the implementation of privati-
sation, namely, in the form of a joint-stock close company, the Hungarian 
Privatisation and State Holding Company Limited by Shares was established 
(hereinafter: HPSHC). Although, unequivocal detachment from government 
property did not ensue at that time, either, AP align with the amendment of the 
Act of 1995 on the Budget considerably increased the scope of the assets to be 
privatised and simultaneously, the coersion towards privatisation. The primary 
mission of HPSHC was privatisation and its secondary task consisted in the 
administration of assets.49 The scope of companies to be retained in long-term 
state ownership was already itemised under the act, their number decreased 
substantially. Other venture capital could merely “provisionally” fall under the 
category of state property, they were designated to be privatized “the sooner 
the better”: the basic objective of AP was the acceleration of privatisation.50  
 AP basically regulated market privatisation, which was to be implemented 
in return for cash, thereby, it intended to restrict preferential and “bogus” (István 
Csillag) privatisation to exceptional cases. In comparison with the law of 1992, 
AP considerably increased the constitutional guarantees of privatisation (e.g., 
via the prescription of privatisational memoranda) as well as the publicity and 
transparency of privatisation. Accordingly, the basic privatisational technique 
shall unvariably be the announcement of competitions, whereas, the method 
shall be the conclusion of an atypical deed of sale, i.e., a privatisation agree-
ment.51 
  
 48 See, Sárközy, T.: Küzdelem a privatizációs törvény körül (Struggles Concerning the 
Law of Privatisation). In: Kurtán, S.–Sándor, P–Vass, L. (ed.): Magyarország Politikai 
Évkönyve 1994-ről (The Political Yearbook of Hungary on 1994). Budapest, 1995. 194–
212. See further, Mihályi, P.: A magyar privatizáció krónikája. op. cit. 199–224. For a 
detailed analysis of AP per se, see, Csillag I.–Komáromi, G.–Sárközy, T.: Kommentár az új 
privatizációs törvényhez (Commentary on the New Law Pertaining to Privatisation). 
Budapest, 1995.  
 49 On the administration of assets, see, Komáromi, G.: Privatizációs technikák, va-
gyonkezelés (Privatisational Techniques and Property Management). In: Az új privatizációs 
törvény (The New Law Pertaining to Privatisation). Budapest, 1995. 138–158.; Mihályi, P.: 
Privatizáció és vagyonkezelés (Privatisation and Property Management). Közgazdasági 
Szemle, 44 (1996) No. 3.  
 50 See, Csillag, I.: Az ÁPV Rt. vagyona és gazdálkodása (The Assets and the Manage-
ment of HPSHC). In: Az új privatizációs törvény. op. cit. 98–111.  
 51 Concerning the invitation of tenders related to privatisation and privatisation agree-
ments, see, Wellmann, Gy. A privatizációs pályázatokkal kapcsolatos jogkérdések (Legal 
Issues Concerning Tenders Related to Privatisation). Gazdaság és Jog, 2 (1995) No. 12., 
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 The position of Government and HPSHC in the issue of privatisation was 
unvariably Janus-faced. That consisted in the followings: on the one hand, 
privatisation was an interest of the state, since revenues and results were 
indispensable for HPSHC, on the other hand, privatisation curtailed the power 
of the state and shortened the term of the sustainability of HPSHC. In the 
recent 17 years, the so-called privatisational jacket has undoubtedly and 
several times meant the life-belt of the budget policies of Governments. 
Nevertheless, in defiance of the above, the great majority of the state sector 
was privatised, the so-called strategic privatisation was accomplished between 
1995 and 1997. By 1998, thereby, the privatisation entailed by political trans-
formation was concluded,52 therefore, problems related to privatisation were 
for the time being removed from the basic agenda of economic policy. This 
fact was extremely appreciated in the accession process of Hungary to the EU, 
since we significantly preceded the neighbouring countries.53 
 
8. Pursuant to AP, which took effect in June, 1995, the most efficient phase 
of Hungarian privatisation in re sales ensued between the summers of 1995 
and 1996. As an irreversible process, the privatisation of the “inner core” of 
the state sector, i.e., of the so-called strategic companies took place in the 
following crucial areas: electric energy, gas and oil industry, mass media 
(radio, television), telecommunication and the bank sector. The most important 
element of this process is not the fact that a privatisational income exceeding 
450 billion HUF was produced in 1995, without which, however, the situation 
of the annual budget would have been critical and financial stabilisation could 
have hardly been achieved. What is considered more essential is that strategic 
privatisation also affecting national public utilities dispelled the political 
uncertainty prevailing in the West vis-a-vis Hungary, therefore, foreign 
investment was relaunched, the extent of which accreted to 16 billion USD by 
1997. Furthermore, the series of privatisations effected in 1995 and 1996 did 
really swung Hungarian privatisation over the impasse, therefore, by 1997, the 
                                                      
Csillag, I.: Privatizációs szerződések (Privatisation Agreements). Gazdaság és Jog, 2 
(1995) No. 7.  
 52 For an analysis of the process broken down according to companies, see, Mihályi, P.: 
A magyar privatizáció krónikája. op. cit. 251–350. See further, Csáki, Gy.–Macher, Á.: A 
magyarországi privatizáció 10 éve (1988–1997) (A Decade of Privatisation in Hungary: 
1988–1997). In: Kurtán–Sándor–Vass (ed.): Magyarország évtizedkönyve. op. cit. 116–130. 
 53 For an analysis of the comparison of the law pertaining to privatisation elaborated by 
the mid-1990s in other former socialist states and in Hungary, see, Sárközy, T.: Rend-
szerváltozás és a privatizáció joga (The Change of Regime and Law Pertaining to Privati-
sation). Budapest, 1997. 
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expectation that institutional privatisation would be approaching its end was 
fulfilled. Private property attained a decisive majority in Hungary, thereby, the 
share of long-term state property in the entrepreneurial sector could be 
restricted by the millenium to an extent similar to that prevailing in Austria, 
Italy and France. This has also been brought forth by an increasing scale of 
privatisation effected by local governments in 1996–1997. 
 According to my opinion, AP of 1995 (despite its deficiencies also criticised 
by us) had a paramount role in this internationally recognised result, which 
was also appreciated in the country report related to the accession of Hungary 
to the EU. On the basis of the norms set forth under the pertinent statutes of 
1992, which were basically focused on the processes of reorganisation, “strategic 
privatisation” would have been much more circumstantially implementable. 
According to my view, the criticisms that AP was mere skeleton law, some of 
its solutions were roughly drafted and allowed for multifarious constructions 
cannot be substantiated. Undubiously and mainly by reason of the numerous 
motions for its amendment, there were misformulated rules as well as unravelled 
provisions under the AP in the absence of practical experience, therefore, they 
required active contribution on the part of law-appliers (so-called directive 
norms). At the same time, in the majority of cases, the problems were properly 
solvable with the generally applied instruments of the interpretation of law 
assuming that the provisions were benevolently enforced. 
 Of course, the privatisation of strategic major companies and banks between 
1995 and 1997 involved numerous contestable elements. Although, privatisation 
in principle ensued after several years’ preparation, its major part was low-
standard, the overpaid counsellors generally carried out quite slipshod work, 
the preparation of pertinent regulations (the amendments of acts pertaining to 
energy and gas supply and to price-formation by authorities, etc.) was also rather 
ad hoc and a number of legal objections can be made vis-a-vis the concluded 
agreements. Regrettably, issues were still unvariably over-politicised, the consid-
eration of political aspects was excessively emphatic, which resulted primarily 
from the composition of the management board of HPSHC. From the outset, 
the staff of HPSHC in view of its activity was over-dimensioned (it consisted 
of almost 500 employees), its internal organisational structure was tangled 
and bureaucratic. The multiple-level system of decision-making was too 
protracted and involved lots of default possibilities. Fluctuation mainly at the 
management level of HPSHC was considerable between 1995–2005, the 
expertise of the apparatus was generally feeble, therefore, it was exposed to 
external counsellors. Thence, this apparatus was too expensive and inefficient. 
 Nevertheless, this relatively feeble state apparatus of privatisation and 
poorly structured organisation  did implement the progress of privatisation. 
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Succeeding the German privatisation completed by 1995, Hungary was the 
second socialist state, which, essentially within 10 years, could establish the 
proprietary structure marking the states of the EU, i.e., which is based on the 
decisive majority of private property, even if the process included major 
financial losses, contradictions, sordid social phenomena (albeit, the scale of 
these, according to my view, was substantially outstripped by those discernible 
in other former socialist states). First and foremost, we escaped the state-
capitalist path. Which, I assume, is a significant achievement in defiance of all 
well-founded criticisms. The anomalous unity of the roles of the state as public 
authority and proprietor ceased to exist in Hungary by the end of the 1990s 
owing to the completion of institutional privatisation, since the change of the 
proprietary structure of the economic regime had been accomplished, which was 
regarded as a common irreversible guarantee both of a multi-party parliamentary 
democratic system and of an economic order based on market competition. In 
this situation, on the one hand, the legal method of the conclusion of the 
former intermittent and massive privatisation needed to be elaborated, on the 
other hand, the new structural, economic and legal order of the utilisation of 
the persisting state property also needed to be legally regulated. 
 Within the purview of the statutes of 1991–92, state property had been 
divided into “government” and “venture” capital, however, this distinction was 
never supported by refined principal grounds. Theoretically, government property 
can be essentially divided into two parts: on the one hand, the so-called public 
property in the strict sense of the phrase (roads, public places, rivers, lakes, 
etc., which are managed by the state with a view to the benefit of the entire 
population of the country), on the other hand, the so-called fiscal capital of the 
state, which substantively constitutes the capital allocated to the budgetary 
organs of central state administration and local governments. The part of the 
venture capital of the state not designed to be privatised is essentially not 
constituted by “free” assets (e.g., real estates), but for the purposes of national 
economy, it is allocated to the associations, in which the state has a majority 
ownership, therefore, any regulation concerning these assets essentially implies 
the determination of the management system of these companies. The basic 
contradiction of the system established pursuant to Acts 53 and 54 of 1992 
(and sustained under AP of 1995) was that these statutes regulated venture 
capital to be retained in long-term state ownership, but upon the concrete 
determination of these assets (itemised under the Supplement to AP), they 
referred exclusively to companies. Therefore, upon the conclusion of institu-
tional privatisation, the capital to be retained in state property permanently, 
scilicet, for a long term and stably, needed to be recircumscribed. However, 
that is an issue that basically determines the future economic policy of a 
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country, thereby, it may constitute a battleground for social democratic, 
Christian Democratic or liberal ideologies. 
 
9. Nevertheless, the conclusion of institutional privatisation was deferred by 
the Horn-Government to the post-election period, whereas, the Orbán-Govern-
ment in power between 1998–2002 privatised relatively little, what is more, 
renationalisation was also effected in a low scale. However, the socialist-liberal 
Governments following 2002 laid a renewed emphasis on the privatisation of 
the remains of state property that did not belong to government property. By 
2005, the law pertaining to the conclusion of institutional privatisation, the 
cessation of HPSHC and to the organisation of a state holding company 
(publicly financed institution or joint-venture company) had been drafted, never-
theless, there was a pertinent, fierce, three years’ controversy even within the 
coalition. Therefore, Act 116 of 2007 on the Conclusion of Institutional 
Privatisation And on a Single State Property Management Organisation took 
effect as late as on 1st January, 2008. Within the purview of this act, AP of 
2005 was annulled and the new organisational and operational order of the 
management of state property was determined. 
 N.B., Hungarian experts had reached a consensus already at the end of the 
1990s that the scattered management of state property needed to be terminated. 
Therefore, by the early 2000s, the modern Hungarian fiscus, the Hungarian 
State Treasury had been established, which has managed the whole range of 
monetary assets of (the organs of) the Hungarian state deposited on the unified 
fiscal account. State debts are managed by the Government Debt Management 
Agency Private Company Limited by Shares. Nonetheless, the real assets of 
the state were scattered: HPSHC, the Treasury Property Directorate and the 
Ministries themselves also held state-owned real estates and association 
shares. Therefore, the establishment of a single organisational and operational 
structure for the management of the real assets of the state was deemed 
reasonable. Nonetheless, a dispute emerged in re the organisational form of 
that trustee: 
 a) In my view, a State Holding Organisation would have expediently 
functioned as a publicly financed institution, which, as a so-called Real State 
Treasury could have later united with the fiscus, 
 b) According to the other standpoint, the Real State Treasury needed to be 
established as a joint-stock company for the purpose of the expedient utili-
sation of the remnants of state property. In this case, the unified management 
of property would not be governed by the more flexible rules pertaining to 
government property, which, however, is contestable from a constitutional 
point of view. 
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 Eventually, following long disputes and a veto by the Head of State, pursuant 
to Act 116 of 2007 the second standpoint was adopted and the Hungarian 
State Holding Company was established as of 1st January, 2008. This close 
company limited by shares and functioning as a one-entity business association 
of Government, is not subordinated to a Board of Directors or a Supervisory 
Board, but its management is accomplished by the State Holding Council 
consisting of seven members appointed by Government. This company limited 
by shares manages basically state property, but it is also entitled to its sale, as a 
matter of course, under safeguarding regulations. 
  
10. I contend that implied the final stage of the history of Hungarian privati-
sation. We may ponder, whether Hungarian privatisation was a sequence of 
successes. From institutional-taxonomic and macro-economic points of view 
and in re the final outcome, I assume the answer is by all means affirmative. 
Under extremely difficult social-economic and political conditions, the anomalous 
unity of the roles of the state as public authority and proprietor was de facto 
terminated and the proprietary structure based on the predominance of private 
property necessary for the sound functioning of modern market economy 
emerged. From a strategic point of view, subsequently to the conclusion of 
privatisation, the future Hungarian state will need to function in a basically 
different manner from that it did formerly. The state as a proprietor frames a 
different economic policy from that of the state that establishes a regulatory 
framework, that can motivate and provide services. The altered task will 
necessarily and in return affect the organisational and operational mechanisms 
of the state. Thus, we must be facing a consequential reform in re state 
organisation and administrative modernisation. 
 As to its manner of implementation, Hungarian privatisation was naturally 
not a sequence of successes, either, basically on objective grounds and from 
the outset, it could not be. In such a profound economic crisis even the chance 
of optimal privatisation was precluded, assets of such a massive scale could 
not be so rapidly privatised at an adequate price. Furthermore, as a matter of 
course, objective reasons were substantially supplemented by subjective 
flaws: unpreparedness, the absence of experience and of a long-term strategy of 
privatisation, the standard change of the “conception” concerning privatisation, 
economic and legal-technical defaults, detriments entailed by over-politici-
sation, etc. We can also refer to the element that also had a role, namely, that 
capitalists (i.e., foreign investors) did not know socialist management (scilicet, 
they ignored socialist precedence), whereas, former socialists did not know 
capitalist management, scilicet, they could not conform to market economy. 
Therefore, we have undergone a long-standing process of learning and we 
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have learnt severe lessons during privatisation, indeed: in several cases, we 
could have imposed higher prices, we could have economised on expenditure, 
we could have elaborated more efficient and skillful privatisational processes 
and we could have applied more effective privatisational schemes. Finally, 
what does not entirely belong to the scope of subjective flaws: corruption and 
abuse could have been more efficiently foreclosed, even if we admit that in the 
majority of other former socialist states more scandals, corruption and criminality 
could be discerned than in Hungary, in which we can find scarce solace. 
 What we can certainly set forth is that our national property has not 
disappeared, it merely transformed during the process of privatisation. National 
property seems to have been lost only for those who identify national property 
with state property and do not recognise that the property of private enterprises 
and foreign investments in Hungary do become incorporated into our national 
property. The facts that GDP decreased in the first period of political trans-
formation and that significant unemployment occurred were basically not the 
consequences of privatisation (on the contrary, in my view, these would have 
emerged more stringently without privatisation), and in the long-run, privati-
sation per se actually facilitated the development of our economy. Finally, we 
could expatiate on the element of social justice. Without doubt, it could not be 
sufficiently guaranteed by way of privatisation, since individuals in auspicious 
circumstances and in powerful positions, individuals who realised their social 
capital (naturally, in many cases these persons belonged to the former state 
party, to the former state apparatus or company management) could surely 
acquire much more than others (we do not have precise sociological figures). 
However, no capitalist system has persisted so far, which would have been 
based on the property of the majority of the population (which is valid even in 
case of the most prosperous countries of the world). Why should we suppose 
that this could have been achieved via a privatisational strategy in Hungary? 
Even the critics of privatisation acknowledge that “the winners” of privati-
sation constitute a “mere” 20 p.c. of the population, which as a proportion is 
not a bad achievement, in my view. Anyway, we are certainly not dealing with 
a history of privatisation, which has produced some hundreds of millionaire 
criminals and several millions of deprivated. This is also valid, even if real 
social considerations should have been more effectively enforced in various 
areas of economic policy. We must acknowledge that a peculiar form of 
primitive accumulation of capital ensued (which derived from state property, 
since we did not possess other property) during an unexpected restructuring 
from “semi-socialism” into modern capitalism due to world political (and not 
intrinsic) factors. Just like the English, German, American, etc. primitive 
accumulation of capital at the dawn of capitalism were ethically quite filthy 
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processes taking many decades, the accelerated process of the primitive 
accumulation of capital taking merely some years could exclusively undergo in 
an ethically contestable manner. (Its dimension is a moot point.) Nevertheless, 
the histrorically belated Hungarian system of new-capitalism having evolved 
by the millenium can eventually prove to be a liveable and habitable society 
(which is not a groundless expectation), the social dejection brought forth by 
the shock owing to restructuring may disappear and we may ascend towards 
“Europe”, even if not the entire society, as some presumed, but at least a large 
segment of the society, mostly the younger generations. 
 Naturally, the proprietary structure adequate for privatisation and market 
economy per se does not constitute a guarantee for social-economic success. 
This framework also allows for faulty economic policies and world economic 
processes may still destroy national economies. But our new proprietary structure 
is more viable for facing the challenges of modernisation and globalisation 
than our economy preceding privatisation was. Namely, in the future private 
enterprises will rival private enterprises, the possibility of easy acquisition 
from “soft” state-owned property has been precluded. We allow that several 
citizens may have acquired great fortunes in the course of privatisation by 
abusing their positions. Nevertheless, many already demonstrate the inability 
to hold their grounds in the market, thereby, they will relentlessly fail and the 
state or politics will not or will hardly be able to “subsidise” them.  
 We still need time to compile an inventory of and to render a complete, 
scientific processing of Hungarian privatisation. As far as I am concerned, I 
would be inclined to qualify it as “optimistically impropitious”. In the meantime, 
passions may also abate, the majority will recognise that not everybody can be 
a proprietor and that efficient work is more appreciated by private enterprises 
than by state-owned companies. 
 As the above elucidate, Hungarian business law was an active contributor 
to Hungarian privatisation, which took 10 years, and I think it was capable of 
guaranteeing an operative legal framework for shaping market economy, 
partially by renewing itself. As a matter of course, there have been mistakes 
and errors both in law-making and the application of law. Nevertheless, by 
way of striving towards evolution, maintaining the long-standing elements, 
simultaneously modernising itself and conforming to the business law of the 
European Union, law-making could secure appropriate bases for the consolida-
tion of Hungarian private enterprises.  
